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The Deterrent Effect of Arrest in Domestic
Violence: Differentiating Between Victim and
Perpetrator Response
JohannaNiemi-Kiesildinen*
I. INTRODUCTION
The policies concerning arrest in domestic violence cases have changed
markedly over the last fifteen years. In the 1970s, the general policy of
police intervention in domestic disputes was to avoid arrest as much as
possible, to calm down the parties and to mediate the conflict.' Today, all
U.S. states allow warrantless arrests in domestic misdemeanors2 and several

states mandate arrest. Even in states with no mandatory arrest policy,
many police departments prefer to arrest in domestic violence cases. In
addition, many states require their police departments to state their policies
concerning response to domestic violence These changes in policy are the
result of several factors. First, feminist groups have made the issue of

domestic violence visible. In addition, there have been numerous highly
publicized lawsuits against police departments for negligent police action
in domestic violence cases.! However, the Supreme Court decision
* Associate Professor of procedural law, University of Helsinki. The concern that led
to writing this Article arose during the 1997-1998 academic year when I was a Fulbright
scholar at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School. The Article was written while
I was a research fellow in Finland's Academy. I wish to thank Professors Howard Erlanger,
Kari Moxness and Pdivi Honkatukia for their comments.
1. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO
CUSTODY 50, 121 (1965) (describing the practices in the 1960s); see also Joan Zorza, The
Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 46, 48 (1992) (quoting the police training materials of the seventies); DEL
MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 94 (1981).
2. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participationin Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1850, 1859 (1996).
3. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 968.075 (2000). Wisconsin, in addition to having a
mandatory arrest law, requires a policy statement of all police departments. See id.
4. Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1977), a class action lawsuit against the New
York police department and its officers, ended in settlements. The most influential case was
Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984), in which the jury
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DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services represents

a setback for domestic violence victims seeking legal redress against police
departments. Prior to the DeShaney decision, domestic violence victims
could sue individual police officers for violating their substantive due
process rights when the police failed to protect them. DeShaney seriously
curtailed these rights. Because of the Court's decision, a domestic violence

victim must fit into a very narrow class of exceptions in order to make out a
substantive due process claim.6 There are still, however, several grounds
on which a civil rights action for police negligence may be successful,
especially if it is based on sex discrimination or a special relationship.
Change has also been brought about by empirical research. In 1984,
Professor Sherman and his group conducted the first empirical and

experimental study on the effects of arrest on domestic violence in
Minneapolis."

The results, which were widely published and had a

permanent policy impact, showed that arrest deters recidivism.8
The authors, however, cautioned against hasty conclusions and called

for more research.' Replicate studies were conducted in the late 1980s in
Omaha (NE),'0 Milwaukee (WI)," Charlotte (NC),'2 Colorado Springs
rewarded the plaintiff over two million dollars in damages for flagrant negligence in police
actions that failed to protect Mrs. Thurman from the violence of her ex-husband. See
generally Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1498 (1993) [hereinafter Developments].
5. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
6. See J. David Hirschel & Ira W. Hutchison, III., Female Spouse Abuse and the Police
Response: The Charlotte,North CarolinaExperiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 73,
85-86 (1992); Laura S. Harper, Battered Women Suing Police for Failure to Intervene:
Viable Legal Avenues After DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,
75 CORNELL L. REV. 1393 (1990). See generally Developments, supranote 4, at 1500.
7. See Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Minneapolis Domestic Violence
Experiment, 1 POLICE FOUND. REP. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Sherman & Berk, Minneapolis
Domestic Violence]; see also Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific
DeterrentEffects of Arrestfor Domestic Assault, 49 AM. Soc. REV. 261 (1984) [hereinafter
Sherman & Berk, Specific DeterrentEffects]; LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND DILEMMAS (1992) [hereinafter SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE].

8. Because the study became public the same year the influential Thurman case was
decided, its impact is difficult to assess. The change in arrest policies of big police
departments in the mid-eighties was documented in ELLEN G. COHN & LAWRENCE W.
SHERMAN, POLICE POLICY ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 1986: A NATIONAL SURVEY (1987). See
generally Thurman, 595 F. Supp. 1521.
9. See Sherman & Berk, MinneapolisDomestic Violence, supra note 7, at 1.
10. See generally Franklyn W. Dunford et al., The Omaha Domestic Violence Police
Experiment: Final Report to the National Institute of Justice, Technical Report, INST. OF
BEHAV. SC., U. OF COLORADO (1989) [hereinafter Dunford et al., Omaha Domestic
Violence]; Franklyn W. Dunford et al., The Role of Arrest in Domestic Assault: The Omaha
Police Experiment, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 183 (1990) [hereinafter Dunford et at., Role of Arrest];
Franklyn W. Dunford, The Measurement of Recidivism in Cases of Spouse Assault, 83 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 120 (1992) [hereinafter Dunford, Measurement of Recidivism].
11. See generally SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 7. The research
was originally reported in Lawrence W. Sherman & Douglas A. Smith, Crime, Punishment
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(CO)' 3 and Miami Dade (FL).'4 The results did not replicate those of the
original Minneapolis study. The deterrent effects of arrest were much more
ambiguous. Because the conclusions of these studies are still often invoked5
both in scholarly literature and everyday discussion with practitioners,1
their critical review is still timely.
Theoretically, these studies relied on theories of social control and
deviance and therefore, focused on the effects of arrest on the suspect.' 6
According to the social control theory, those suspects who have the most to
lose-a job, marriage or social respect-are the ones most sensitive to the
deterrent effect of arrest. Sherman's study revealed empirical support for
the theory concerning employment, but not marriage." The deviance or
labeling theory, in contrast, suggests that arrest may bolster the labeling of
deviant persons and thus increase future violence.
Reading these studies, I became concerned that they do not seriously
consider the effects of arrest on victims' behavior. Contemporary
criminological research addresses the role victims and other people play in
reporting crime to the police. 9 This factor should also be taken into

consideration when analyzing reports of domestic violence.

To put it

simply, different methods of police intervention in domestic violence cases
may have different effects on victims' willingness to call the police when

and Stake in Conformity: Legal and Extralegal Control of Domestic Violence, 57 AM. Soc.
REv. 680 (1992). See also Lawrence W. Sherman et al., From Initial Deterrence to LongTerm Escalation: The Effects of Short-Custody Arrest for Poverty Ghetto Domestic
Violence, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 821 (1991) [hereinafter Sherman et al., Initial Deterrence];
Lawrence W. Sherman & Janell D. Schmidt, The Variable Effects of Arrest on Criminal
Careers: The Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment, 83 J. CRAM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
137 (1992) [hereinafter Sherman & Schmidt, Variable Effects ofArrest].
12. See generally J. DAVID HIRsCHEL ET AL., CHARLOTTE SPOUSE ASSAULT REPLICATION
PROJECT: FINAL REPORT FOR THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (1991) [hereinafter
HIRsCHEL ET AL., CHARLOTTE SPOUSE ASSAULT]; Hirschel & Hutchison, supra note 6, at 73.
13. See generally Richard A. Berk et al., A Bayesian Analysis of the Colorado Springs
Spouse Abuse Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 170 (1992).
14. See generally Anthony M. Pate & Edwin E. Hamilton, Formal and Informal
Deterrents to Domestic Violence: The Dade County Spouse Assault Experiment, 57 AM.
Soc. REv. 691 (1992); Hubert Williams, Spouse Abuse Research Raises New Questions
aboutPoliceResponse to Domestic Violence, POLICE FOUND. REP. 5 (1992).
15. See, e.g., Linda G. Mills, Intuition and Insight: A New Job Description for the
Battered Woman's Prosecutorand Other More Modest Proposals,7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J.
183, 189 (1997); Barbara Fedders, Note, Lobbying for Mandatory-Arrest Policies: Race,
Class, and the Politics of the Battered Women's Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 281, 291 (1997). In addition, judges, prosecutors and defense lawyers often
referred to these empirical studies when the author of this Article made field observations
and interviews in county courts in Madison and Milwaukee, Wisconsin in 1998.
16. See SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 7, at 160.
17. See Sherman & Smith, supra note 11, at 685. See generally Kirk R. Williams &
Richard Hawkins, The Meaning ofArrestfor Wife Assault, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 163 (1989).
18. See SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 7, at 181-84; Sherman &
Smith, supra note 11, at 685-86; Williams, supra note 14, at 5.
19. See infra Section II.

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:2

they are repeatedly victimized.
The above mentioned empirical studies could help to support this
hypothesis. In these experimental studies, domestic violence calls were
responded to in three different ways. In the first group the police made an
arrest, in the second group they gave a warning or advice to the parties and
in the third group the method of intervention varied depending on the
study. The effect of intervention was measured after six months by three
factors: (1) victim interviews; (2) the number of subsequent arrests and (3)
the number of calls or other reports to the police.
The authors of the empirical studies used the number of subsequent
arrests or calls to the police, which I will refer to as the "official data," as
the primary measure for repeat violence. I will argue that victim interviews
reflect repeat violence more adequately than these official data. The
official data reflect not only the level of violence but also the victim's
willingness to report it. Consequently, after arrest, victim interviews may
show less repeat violence than after other types of interventions, but the
official data may show more. A likely explanation for this pattern is that
arrest deters violence and encourages victims to call the police.
In this Article, the results of the empirical studies are reanalyzed,
In four out of six studies, the
taking victim impact into account.
relationship between victim interview data and official data indicates that
this hypothesis may be correct. Since the empirical studies do not consider
the effects of arrest on the victim's willingness to report, the data are not
easily analyzed from this vantagepoint. These methodological problems
are discussed. Notwithstanding this, I argue that reexamining the studies
shows that victim impact should be taken into account when researching
the effects of arrest in domestic violence.
II. VICTIMS AS AGENTS AND REPORTING OF CRIME
A. VICTIMS AS AGENTS
The empirical research's failure to consider the impact on victims may
be due to our conceptions of agency and victimization. Victims' reactions
to police intervention may have been easily overlooked because the
victim/agent dichotomy in domestic violence is particularly stigmatizing,
stereotypical and gendered.20 Even feminist theories of power and male
domination, which have been helpful in explaining the undeniably
gendered nature of domestic violence, sometimes obscure the agency of
victims.2 ' For example, theories of learned helplessness and "battered wife

20. See generally Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the

Issue of Separation,90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991).
21. See generally Martha Mahoney, Women's Lives, Violence, and Agency, in THE
PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE (Martha Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994).
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syndrome ' "2 have increased awareness of the serious psychological
consequences of domestic violence, but at the same time have denied
agency to victims. Recent empirical work has challenged the notion that
victims of domestic violence are helpless, passive and incompetent.' Such
research shows that battered women use a number of survival and
protection tactics, ranging from choices of how and when to speak to
decisions of leaving and calling the police.24 The victim/agent dichotomy
has also been challenged in recent theor and has gradually given way to
seeing the victim as capable of reasoned action.
Some authors have paid attention to the possible effect arrest may have
on victims' behavior. Grant Bowman suggests that arrest may empower
the victim by giving her time to arrange for safety. 2 It has also been
argued that arrest affirms the victim's rights27 or gives the victim a sign that
there are forces to help her.28 Also, arrest protects the victim from
immediate danger and violence more effectively than other intervention.
Therefore, we would expect arrest to encourage the victim to call the police
in repeat victimization.29 According to this hypothesis, victims whose
perpetrators are not arrested experience police intervention as futile and are
22. See, e.g., LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979); LENORE WALKER, THE
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984).
23. See, e.g., LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITIcs AND HISTORY
OF FAMILY VIOLENCE (1989).

24. See Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in
Domestic Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REv. 2117, 2136 (1993).
25. See Mahoney, supra note 20. See generally EDWARD W. GONDOLF & ELLEN R.
FISCHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED

HELPLESSNESS (1988). This critique is related to the feminist philosophy of subjectivity that
challenges the notion of isolated, autonomous and gendered subjectivity in Western
philosophy.

See SEYLA BENHABIB, SrrUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY AND

POSTMODERNISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS 142 (1992). See generally NGAIRE NAFFINE,
LAW AND THE SEXES: EXPLORATIONS IN FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE (1990).

For a

psychoanalytical point of view, see generally Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988).
26. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, The Arrest Experiments: A Feminist Critique, 83 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 201, 204 (1992); SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
supranote 7, at 278.
27. See Bowman, supra note 26, at 204.
28. See Marion Wanless, Note, MandatoryArrest: A Step Toward EradicatingDomestic
Violence, But is it Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 533, 549 (1996).
29. See Lisa G. Lerman, The Decontextualizationof Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 217, 233 (1992). This is consistent with the information crime surveys
provide on why crime is not reported to the police. Some reasons given by victims reflect
whether they experienced the crime as a minor incident or private matter. Often, however,
the answers reflect how victims expect the police will or can act to protect their interests.
See MICHAEL J. HINDELANG, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN EIGHT AMERICAN CITIES: A

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF COMMON THEFT AND ASSAULT 390 (1976); JAN VAN DUK ET AL.,
EXPERIENCES OF CRIME ACROSS THE WORLD: KEY FINDINGS FROM THE 1989 INTERNATIONAL

CRIME SURVEY 69 (1991); KEITH A. BOTTOMLEY, CRIMINOLOGY IN FOCUS: PAST TRENDS
AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 27 (1979). See generally Leslie W. Kennedy, Going it Alone:
UnreportedCrime and IndividualSelf-Help, 16 J. CRIM. JUST. 403 (1988).
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less likely to contact the police in the future.
On the other hand, it has been questioned whether arrest has an
empowering effect. The victim may experience arrest more as an
authoritarian outside intervention than her own empowering choice.0
Furthermore, arrest may discourage the victim from calling the police if the
arrest hurts her economically by, for example, causing her partner to lose
his job or a week's salary, or by leading to divorce and a subsequent loss of
lifestyle.3' It has even been suggested that arrest, rather than decreasing
violence, increases the quantity or severity of attacks, 2 making the victim
less likely to call the police.
The hypothesis put forward in this Article rests on the assumption that
arrest empowers and protects victims, at least in the short run, and
therefore, encourages calling the police in cases of repeat victimization.
Miller and Krull have found that repeat victimization varies in different
victim groups.33 Similarly, changes in willingness to call the police
probably vary between different victim groups, depending on what other
resources are available to the victim, how dependent the victim is on the
perpetrator and the victim's social status and integration. The hypothesis
here is based on the assumption that victims call the police only when
under real and serious threat. Therefore, I expect the overall willingness of
victims to call the police to increase as a consequence of an arrest.
The empirical studies give an opportunity to test this hypothesis. In
reality, the victim's reaction is based on what she expects the police to do,
not only on what the police actually do. The victim's expectations of what
the police will do can be based on a number of factors other than her own
experiences of police intervention. In the empirical studies, however, the
initial intervention, that is arrest, warning or separation, was randomly
assigned. In all other respects, the groups were treated the same. Thus,
differences in victim response should result from the different methods of
intervention.
An additional problem is that not only victims themselves call the
police. According to empirical studies, the percentage of calls made by
those other than the victim vary from one-third to two-thirds.34 Many of
these calls are made by children, yet other family members and neighbors
30. See Wanless, supra note 28, at 548.
31. See Bowman, supra note 26, at 204.
32. See Wanless, supra note 28, at 549.
33. See JoAnn Miller & Amy C. Krull, ControllingDomestic Violence: Victim Resources
and Police Intervention, in OUT OF THE DARKNESS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON
FAMILY VIOLENCE 236 (Glenda Kaufman Kantor & Jana L. Jasinski eds., 1997).
34. In Milwaukee, 55% of the calls to the police were made by the victim, 42% in Omaha
and 34% in Colorado Springs. See SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 7,
at 326; see also Miller & Krull, supra note 33, at 242. Another study reports that threequarters of the calls reporting domestic violence were made by the victim. See PATRICK A.
LANGAN & CHRISTOPHER A. INNES, PREVENTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 4
(1986).
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also make them. Thus, the term "victim response" includes calls from
other people. One could expect that other people are more likely to call the
police in cases of repeat violence if they are satisfied with the effects of the
initial intervention. In particular, family members are probably motivated
by similar concerns as victims, and therefore equally sensitive to changes
in police action.

B. REPORTING OF CRIME
We have relatively little empirical information on crime victims'
reporting patterns. However, the little we have suggests that a sensitivity to
changes in reporting is essential in measuring the overall amount of crime.
There have also been remarkable changes in reporting domestic crime to
the police during the past twenty years, which shows that changes in
policies can affect victims' reporting patterns. It would make sense that the
experience of each domestic violence victim is important.
Crime statistics and victim surveys show that only a fraction of crime is
ever reported to the police. The relationship between "real" crime and
Institutional
officially reported crime has proven to be complicated."
theories assume that, instead of reflecting a "real" crime rate, official crime
statistics reflect how law enforcement institutions operate and define
deviant behavior as crime.36 Studies on the relationship between crime
reported to the police and crime reported in surveys show that this
relationship varies considerably between different crimes. For example,
serious violent crime and car theft are reported to the police more often
than petty crimes and crimes among intimates.37 Domestic assault is
probably one of the most under-reported crimes both in crime statistics and
in crime surveys.3
35. The shift from realist theories developed by Adolphe Quetelet, which assume a
constant relationship between "real" crime and reported crime, to institutional theories is
described in KEITH A. BOTrOMLEY & CLIVE COLEMAN, UNDERSTANDING CRIME RATES 6-15
(1981). A fuller account of the history of measurement of crime is found in THORSTEN
Illustrative estimates about the
SELLIN, MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY 9 (1964).
relationship between officially recorded crime and hidden crime are still frequently made.
The estimated level of reported crime usually varies between one-third and two-thirds. See
STEVEN

Box,

DEVIANCE, REALrrY AND SOCIErY

27 (1981) (estimating two-thirds); THE

22 (John Muncie & Eugene
McLaughlin eds., 1996) (estimating one-third).
36. See generally John Kitsuse & Aaron Cicourel, A Note on the Uses of Official
See also AARON CICOUREL, THE SOCIAL
Statistics, 11 SOC. PROB. 131 (1963).
ORGANIZATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 24 (1976). Several institutional studies have argued
that law enforcement responds in such a way that statistics emphasize crime in the working
and lower classes. See Box, supra note 35, at 5; THE PROBLEM OF CRIME, supra note 35, at
28; Robert J. Sampson, Effects of Socioeconomic Context on Official Reaction to Juvenile
Delinquency, 51 AM. Soc. REv. 884 (1986).
37. See HINDELANG, supra note 29, at 358; ROBERT M. O'BRIEN, CRIME AND
VICTIMIZATION DATA: LAW AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERIES, VOL. 42, 85 (1985); VAN DUK Er
AL., supra note 29, at 55.
38. Many studies on female victimization have discovered a remarkable amount of
PROBLEM OF CRIME: CRIME, ORDER AND SOCIAL CONTROL
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The relationship between crime reported in victim surveys and police
data has changed over time. While the Uniform Crime Reports showed a
steady increase in reported crime in the 1980s, no equivalent trend was
manifested in the National Crime Surveys. This change was most notable
concerning rape and aggravated assault. 9 Changing policies in the
handling of sexual and domestic crime have impacted the attitudes of the
police, leading to an increase in the recording of these offenses. Also,
victims' willingness to report cases of domestic assault and sexual crimes
to the police has increased. 4
In the experimental studies discussed in this Article, the police were
instructed to record all contacts from the victims. Therefore, the
differences in official data should not reflect different recording patterns,
but a difference either in actual violence or in victims' reporting patterns.
However, victim interviews are not without drawbacks in measuring
"real" crime. Victims do not report all victimization in surveys, especially
if the perpetrator is known to them,4' and they did not report all violence in
the victim interviews in the empirical studies.42 Nonetheless, victim
interviews are still the most reliable source to gauge the effect of police
In the empirical studies, victim interviews revealed more
intervention.
incidents of repeat violence than the official data. This simple fact is
reason enough to consider victim interviews more reliable in measuring
repeat violence than the official data.

unreported domestic crime. See Elizabeth Stanko, Hidden Violence Against Women, in
VICTIMS OF CRIME: A NEW DEAL 40 (Mike Maguire & John Pointing eds., 1988); Mike
Maguire, Crime Statistics, Patternand Trends, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY
168 (1994) (giving an overview); O'BRIEN, supra note 37, at 102; BOTrOMLEY & COLEMAN,
supra note 35, at 67. See generally DIANAE. H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1990).
39. See Robert M. O'Brien, Comparing Detrended UCR and NCS Crime Rates Over
Time: 1973-1986, 18 J. CRIM. JUST. 229, 233-35 (1990).
40. The number of domestic violence calls has soared since the introduction of
mandatory arrest policies and other changes concerning domestic violence. Wanless reports
that the number of domestic calls almost doubled during the first four or five years of
mandatory arrest in New Jersey and Iowa. See Wanless, supra note 28, at 550. In
Milwaukee, police reports of domestic violence almost doubled after the mandatory arrest
law came into force in 1989. See SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 7, at
119. For other studies showing that a change in the response of the criminal justice system
produces a change in the number of crimes reported to the police, see Maguire, supra note
38, at 167.
41. See Wesley G. Skogan, Issues in the Measurement of Victimization, in U.S. DEP'T OF
JUST., BJS REP. 16 (1981); see also O'BRIEN, supra note 37, at 49.
42. See Richard A. Berk et al., The Deterrence Effect of Arrest in Incidents of Domestic
Violence: A Bayesian Analysis of Four Field Experiments, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 698, 700
(1992) [hereinafter Berk et al., DeterrentEffect]; see also Richard A. Berk et al., Colorado
Springs Spouse Assault Replication Project Final Report 129 (1991) (unpublished
manuscript) [hereinafter Berk et al., ColoradoSprings Spouse Assault].
43. See Miller & Krull, supra note 33.
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III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE STUDIES
The six studiese discussed in this Article present an exceptional and
outstanding example of empirical criminological research. Despite the
same basic methodological design, the detailed methodological choices of
the studies differ to some extent. 5 The samples, though not always
selected in the same way, give a consistent picture of the domestic violence
police encounter. Both victims and suspects had a higher rate of
unemployment than the general population of the area,46 African-Americans
were over-represented47 and many suspects had previous criminal records.48
Marriage rate varied in the different samples,49 but most cases included
couples living together at the time of the incident." 51Alcohol consumption
was prevalent, more so among suspects than victims.
Only misdemeanor assaults, and in some studies other misdemeanors,
were included in the studies so that the police could use discretion in
making arrests.52 Felonies were excluded from the studies because police
have no discretion in these matters. In most of the studies, cases in which
44. See supra notes 7, 10-14.
45. See Joel Garner et al., Published Findings from the Spouse Assault Replication
Program:A CriticalReview, 11 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 3, 9 (1995).
46. In the Minneapolis study, for example, 60% of both victims and suspects were
unemployed, while the unemployment rate of the city was 5%. See Sherman & Berk,
Specific Deterrent Effects, supra note 7, at 263. In Milwaukee, 47% of the suspects were
unemployed, whereas in Charlotte the unemployment rate was estimated to be between 22%
to 30%. See SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 7, at 141; MILLER &
KRuLL, supra note 33, at 237.
47. In the Milwaukee study, 75% of the suspects were African-American. In the
Charlotte study, African-Americans made up 70% of the suspects. In other samples, the
proportion was 31 to 43%. See SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 7, at
141. In the Minneapolis study, 57% of the victims and 45% of the suspects were white. See
Sherman & Berk, Specific DeterrentEffects, supra note 7, at 263.
48. The Minneapolis and Omaha studies give previous arrest rates of 57%, see Sherman
& Berk, Specific Deterrent Effects, supra note 7, at 263, and 65%, see Dunford et al.,
Omaha Domestic Violence, supra note 10, at 31, respectively. In Charlotte, 70% had a
criminal record. See HIRSCHEL ET AL., CHARLOTr SPOUSE ASSAULT, supra note 12, at 37.
Previous arrests for domestic violence, however, were less common. See id.
49. Milwaukee had the lowest marriage rate at 30%, and Miami Dade and Colorado
Springs the highest at 79% and 69%, respectively. Others had rates of 35 to 50%. See
Sherman, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 7, at 141.
50. In Milwaukee, for example, 90% were cohabiting at that time. See SHERMAN,
POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 7, at 344.
51. In Dade County, police officers suspected that 70% of suspects used drugs or alcohol.
See Pate & Hamilton, supra note 14, at 693. In Milwaukee, 42% of suspects were
intoxicated. See SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 7, at 344. In Omaha,

70% of suspects and 30% of victims were under the influence of either alcohol or drugs.
See Dunford et al., Omaha Domestic Violence, supra note 10, at 6. In Charlotte, more than
half of the suspects and one-third of the victims were intoxicated. See HIRSCHEL ET AL.,
CHARLOTTE SPOUSE ASSAULT, supra note 12, at 35-36.
52. See Dunford et al., Omaha Domestic Violence, supra note 10, at 29. Harassment was
included in the Colorado Springs experiment, forming the majority of the crimes, and
menacing was included in the Omaha study. See id.
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the victim demanded an arrest were also excluded. Moreover, the victim
and the suspect had to be present at the scene when the police arrived to
make the arrest feasible. 3
Some studies analyzed intervention-as-assigned54 and others analyzed
intervention-as-delivered. In Minneapolis, Charlotte and Colorado Springs,
intervention methods could not always be delivered as assigned. If
intervention-as-assigned could not be delivered, it usually meant that arrest
was used in cases assigned to informal intervention.5 It may be assumed
that in those cases either the suspect's behavior toward the police-threat,
assault, etc.-warranted arrest, or the police deemed the initial crime or the
actual threat toward the victim as serious enough to warrant an arrest.
Since the incidents in arrest groups were probably more serious than in
others, we would expect increased recidivism with arrests if it were
measured on intervention-as-delivered.
While these differences in research design make comparisons of
prevalence or frequency among the research sites practically impossible,
they negligibly impact my reexamination of the studies. In this Article, I
compare the victim interview data with the official data in each study,
using the victim interview data to measure a change in the level of violence
and the official data to measure a possible change in the level of reporting.
As in the original studies, relative differences between arrest groups and
non-arrest groups are compared, not the actual levels of violence. If, for
example, victim interviews reveal less violence but the official data
indicate more calls to the police when the suspect was arrested as compared
with no arrest, the study suggests that arrest deters violence and encourages
the victim to call the police. For the purpose of this analysis, the
relationship between victim data and official data is crucial, not the actual
levels of violence.
The studies provide information about changes in violence and in
victims' reporting behavior at three different points after the initial
incident. First, some of the studies provide information about the effect of
arrest on victims' safety immediately after the incident. Second, all of the
studies provide victim interview data and official data about subsequent
incidences of violence six months after the initial incident. Third, some of
the studies report the official measures of recidivism after one year or
more.
The official data on repeat violence includes both the number of calls

53. See Sherman & Berk, Specific DeterrentEffects, supra note 7, at 262-63.
54. In the Milwaukee and Omaha studies, intervention-as-assigned and intervention-asdelivered was almost identical, whereas in the Colorado Springs and Charlotte studies there
were differences. See Dunford et al., Omaha Domestic Violence, supra note 10, at 11.
55. For methodological differences, see generally Patrick R. Gartin, Dealing with Design
Failures in Randomized Field Experiments: Analytic Issues Regarding the Evaluation of

Treatment Effects, 32 J. REs.

IN CRIME& DELINQ.

432 (1995).
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or other reports to the police and the number of subsequent arrests. The
reports indicate the actual level of reporting of domestic crime. These data
are sensitive to possible changes in patterns of reporting. 6 Therefore, in
this Article, the number of hotline calls or police reports is used as a
primary measure of victims' reporting to the police.
The number of arrests provides information about the official response
to repeat violence. As such, it is dependent on victims' responses. Yet, I
would argue, the number of arrests is not as sensitive to changes in victim
responses as police reports, since arrest is likely to occur in serious cases57
that may lead to contact with the police regardless of victims' earlier
experiences with the police.
IV. TRACES OF VICTIM IMPACT IN THE EMPIRICAL

STUDIES
A. SHORT-TERM DETERRENT EFFECT OF ARREST
Initial victim interviews were conducted approximately one month
after the initial incident took place. According to these first interviews,
repeat violence in the arrest group was lower than in other groups. Arrest
showed a deterrent effect and protected victims.
In Omaha, Milwaukee and Minneapolis, the victims were asked
whether police action stopped quarrels or fights. In Omaha, 77% of
victims assigned to the mediation group, 87% of the separation group and
93% of the arrest group answered yes." In Milwaukee, victims reported
that they were attacked immediately after the police left in 7% of cases in
which a warning was given. If the suspect was arrested, he attacked the
victim when they met again in 1.7% of the full-arrest cases and 2.2% of the
short-arrest cases." The small number of cases in Minneapolis makes
comparison difficult. However, the incidence of new violence within
twenty-four hours was very low, 1.4%, in arrest and advice groups, and
higher, 5.6%, in the group in which the parties had been separated. The
prevalence of a new quarrel in the separated group was almost four times
higher, 11%, than in the arrest group, 3 %. 0 This result is not surprising,
since there is no guarantee that the suspect will stay away for the required

56. See generallyLerman, supra note 29.
57. Of course, the situation is different if a mandatory arrest policy is rigorously applied,
but such a policy was not followed in the experimental studies.
58. See Dunford et al., Omaha Domestic Violence, supra note 10, at 22-24. That arrest
did not always stop violence is probably explained by analysis based on intervention-asassigned (not intervention-as-delivered). Ninety-five percent of suspects in the arrest group
actually went to jail, and 20% were released within two hours, making continuation of the
conflict possible in the arrest group as well. See id.
59. See SHERMAN, POLIcING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 7, at 350.
60. See Sherman & Berk, Specific Deterrent Effects, supra note 7, at 268.
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6
time limit. '
The deterrent effect generally prevailed for a month up to the initial
interview. In Milwaukee and Metro Dade, those not arrested were much
more likely to repeat than those arrested. 62 In Charlotte, however,
recidivism in all three groups was about the same.63
Only the Milwaukee study reports official data up to the initial
interviews. No statistically significant differences between the groups in
the rate of arrests or hotline calls from the same victim were found.64 Thus,
lesser violence to the victims in the arrest group produced reports to the
police at the same level as in other groups.

B.

AFTER SIX MONTHS

1. Omaha: Victims and Official Data Tell a Different Story
In the Omaha experiment, the cases were assigned to three different
types of intervention: arrest, separation and mediation. Detention times
following arrest varied from the very short, less than two hours, to longer,
with an average of sixteen hours. Separation was achieved by persuading
either the victim or the suspect to leave, with the average length of
separation being three days. Advice to leave the scene was given as part of
mediation and was followed in some cases. 65 Thus, the mediation and
separation groups were not necessarily distinct. Prosecution followed
66
arrest and almost two-thirds of those perpetrators received a sentence.
The victim interviews showed the deterrent effect of arrest. The
prevalence of repeat violence was 27% in the arrest group, compared with
30 to 32% in the two other groups. Serious repeat violence leading to
injury was observed in 15% of arrest cases and in 20 to 21% of others.67
The official data showed about the same amount of recidivism in arrest
and separation groups but less in the mediation group. When mediation
and separation were combined into one group, referred to as informal
intervention, the rate of repeat arrests was almost the same after arrest,
12%, and informal intervention, 10%. The frequency of complaints was

61. Required separation was eight hours in the Minneapolis study. According to this
study, the reunion in the separation group took place within one day in 57% of the
separation cases. See id.
62. See SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 7, at 351; see also
Williams, supra note 14, at 2.
63. See HIRSCHEL ET AL., CHARLOTTE SPOUSE ASSAULT, supra note 12, at 121-22.
64. See SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 7, at 351.
65. See Dunford et al., Role of Arrest, supra note 10, at 190; see also Dunford et al.,
Omaha Domestic Violence, supra note 10, at 22.
66. See Dunford et al., Omaha Domestic Violence, supra note 10, at 31.
67. See Dunford et al., Role of Arrest, supra note 10, at 197; Dunford et al., Omaha
Domestic Violence, supra note 10, at 35. The percentages include cases in which interview
data is missing. Actually, 37 to 44% of interviewed victims reported repeat violence. See
id.
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higher in the arrest group.6 These results are consistent with the hypothesis
that victims in the arrest group experienced less repeat violence than those
in the informal intervention group, but were more likely to call the police in
cases of repeat violence.
2. Different Stories Repeated in Charlotte
The Charlotte study emphasized subsequent prosecution of cases.
Therefore, besides arrest and advice/separation, citation was also an
alternative method of intervention. In the citation group, the suspect
received an order to appear in court to answer charges at a later date.69 For
the arrest group, the length of detainment varied, with the median being
nine hours. Because all arrests were included in the same intervention
group, no conclusions about the effect of the length of detainment can be
made. Both arrests and citations were followed by prosecutorial decisionmaking. About two-thirds of cases in each group were dismissed without
further proceedings. Beyond that, the indictment was sometimes deferred.
About one-fifth of the suspects were found guilty in each group. A
sentence was usually suspended, and only four suspects spent some time in
jail in addition to the initial arrest.
In all groups, but particularly in the advice/separation group, the police
used traditional mediation techniques, such as discussing family problems,
advising marriage counseling and asking the suspect or the victim to
leave.7' Data from the advice and separation groups were combined, and in
the advice/separation group the police advised the suspect or the victim to
leave the scene."
The sample was collected with a careful disqualification procedure.
This resulted in fewer than half of the domestic cases being accepted into
the sample. For example, the victims were asked whether they wanted an
arrest, and if so, the case was excluded. Furthermore, cases in which the
safety of the victim required arrest were excluded. 3
The victim interviews conducted six months after the alternative
intervention showed no significant difference between the groups. There
was more repeat violence in the citation group, 65%, but no difference
between the arrest and separation/advice groups, 59% and 60%,
respectively.7 4 The official measure of recidivism was the number of
68. See Dunford et al., Role of Arrest, supra note 10, at 200. Rates of new complaints
were almost the same, 17% and 16%, respectively. See id.
69. See HIRSCHEL ET AL., CHARLOTTE SPOUSE ASSAULT, supra note 12, at 12.
70. See id. at 147-52.
71. See id. at 17, 62-75; Joan Zorza, Must We Stop Arresting Batterers?: Analysis and
Policy Implications of New Police Domestic Violence Studies, 28 NEw ENG. L. REv. 929,
952 (1994).
72. See SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 7, at 131.
73. See HIRSCHEL ET AL., CHARLOTTE SPOUSE ASSAULT, supra note 12, at 25.
74. See Hirschel & Hutchison, supra note 6, at 111; HIRSCHEL Er AL., CHARLOTTE

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:2

subsequent arrests. Subsequent arrests were lower in the advice/separation
group than in the arrest and citation groups. Arrests involving both the
same victim and any victim were counted, and the result was the same. 7
The results support my hypothesis. If we compare arrest group with
the advice/separation group, victim interviews indicated that recidivism
occurred at the same level in both groups, but it was more often reported to
the police in the arrest group. In the citation group, victims reported more
violence in the interviews, and the rate of arrests was higher than in the
advice/separation group. It is possible that not only arrest but also other
legal intervention from the criminal justice system may encourage the
victim to call the police when repeatedly victimized.
This result is confirmed by comparing those cases where interviewed
victims report recidivism. A new arrest was made in 34% of the cases in
which arrest was the first intervention. Only 31% of the citation group
repeat offenders and 25% of the advice group repeat offenders were
arrested.76 It is possible that the police intervention was different because
the subsequent act of violence was more or less dangerous or because the
police attitude was affected by the previous arrest/citation. However, the
study reports no such difference and, therefore, the possibility that this
result reflects a difference in victim response should not be dismissed.
Victims who have experienced one arrest are more likely to believe that a
call to the police will result in arrest, and thus more likely to make this call.

SPOUSE ASSAULT, supra note 12, at 130. The percentages in the text represent those cases in

which interviews were completed. The researchers repeated the analyses using different
measures of repeat violence, with the same result: no significant difference between the
groups. Insignificant differences varied using different measures. The interpretation of
these numbers is strained by three problems. First, a smaller portion of victims were
interviewed in the advice/separation group than in other groups, either because they
disappeared or were impaired due to drugs or alcohol. As Zorza points out, some domestic
abuse victims turn to drugs or alcohol to cope with the abuse. See Zorza, supra note 71, at
952. Therefore, it is possible that the disappeared cases are repeat violence cases and the
actual amount of violence in the advice/separation group is higher. See HIRSCHEL ET AL.,
CHARLOTrE SPOUSE ASSAULT, supra note 12, at 85, 130; Hirschel & Hutchison, supra note
6, at 110 n.128. Secondly, the cases that were assigned for arrest were different from the
others. There was more alcohol use, more injuries caused to victims and more previous
criminality. While the researchers maintain that these differences are not significant, see
HIRSCHEL ET AL., CHARLOTTE SPOUSE ASSAULT, supra note 12, at 34-40, they all point in the
same direction-more serious cases. Thirdly, analyses were made based on intervention-asassigned, even though several cases assigned to advice/separation and citations were treated
with arrest. See id. at 58. If actual arrest had some deterrent effect, some of that effect
would deter cases in the two other groups. All these cautions suggest that the "almost nodeterrence result" of this study may be due partly to research design.
75. See HIRSCHEL ET AL., CHARLOTTE SPOUSE ASSAULT, supra note 12, at 115; Hirschel
& Hutchison, supra note 6, at 109.
76. See HIRSCHEL ET AL., CHARLOTTE SPOUSE ASSAULT, supra note 12, at 141-42 (Table
11-2).
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3. Different Stories Repeated in Miami Dade
The Miami experiment provides the most convincing support for the
deterrent effect of arrest. In this experiment, cases were assigned to four
groups: (1) arrest and counseling; (2) arrest; (3) advice and counseling and
(4) advice alone by the police. Since counseling in the first and third
groups did not appear to impact the effect of intervention, results were
presented as either arrest or non-arrest interventions. The duration of
detention varied, with an average time of fifteen hours.77
According to victim interviews, the prevalence of repeat violence was
lower in the arrest group, 15%, than in the non-arrest group, 27%. In
addition, the number of assaults was smaller in the arrest group. 8 Official
domestic violence continuation reports79 indicated almost the same level of
repeat violence for each group. Arrests were made more often in the arrest
group, 3.8%, than in the non-arrest group, 1.1%. Again, this is consistent
with my hypothesis.
4. Colorado Springs: The Victims' Stories are Not Taken Seriously
The Colorado Springs experiment differs from the other studies in two
ways. First, a quarter of the suspects overall, or one-third of employed
suspects, were employed by the military, where domestic violence may be
more common.Y A criminal record can be particularly harmful for
somebody in the military, and it is therefore possible that victims in this
sample may be more likely to "hide" repeat violence regardless of
intervention type. Secondly, in addition to assaults, the study also included
menacing and harassment.' Methods of intervention were: (1) arrest and
emergency protection order; (2) emergency protection order and immediate
counseling for the suspect; (3) emergency protection order alone and (4)
restoring order at the scene.'
The victim interviews showed deterrent effect for both the arrest group
and the emergency protection order only group. Victims reported a lower
prevalence of repeat violence in the arrest group. 3 The victim interview
data, however, was dismissed by the authors. They stated, "In brief, we are

77. See Pate & Hamilton, supra note 14, at 693.
78. See Williams, supra note 14, at 4.
79. Prepared in the follow-up by specialized police officers, the continuation reports
contain information about continued violence reported to the police after the incident.
Though content and source of information is not clearly explained in the published report, it
presumably contains information about all repeat incidents that have in some way been
reported to the police. See id. at 3-5.
80. See Zorza, supranote 71, at 957-58.
81. See Berk et al., DeterrentEffect, supra note 42, at 700.
82. See Berk et al., supra note 13, at 174. There was a remarkable crossover: In 18% of
the cases, intervention was not delivered as assigned. Most often, counseling was upgraded
to other treatments. See id. at 177-78.
83. See Berk et al., ColoradoSprings Spouse Assault, supra note 42, at 116-18.
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not taking the apparent intervention effect seriously." '
in all cases.85
The official data of repeat arrest rate was about the same
The emergency protection order, with or without counseling, produced a
slightly lower arrest rate than other methods of intervention, and arrest
produced a slightly lower repeat arrest rate than restoring order at the
scene." Colorado Springs data is consistent with my hypothesis. The
victim interviews reveal less violence in the arrest group, while the official
data yields almost the same rate for all methods of intervention.
5. Minneapolis and Milwaukee Studies
The original Minneapolis study and the Milwaukee study, on the other
hand, do not support my hypothesis. In Minneapolis, the results speak
persuasively for the deterrent effect of arrest. Cases were randomly
assigned to three groups. In one group the suspect was arrested, in another
the suspect was sent away from the scene for eight hours and in the third
parties were counseled. Recidivism in the arrest group, measured by both
victim interviews and official data, was about half of what it was in the
other two groups for the following six months.87
The deterrent effect was found despite background factors such as
employment, criminal history or time in jail.88 The results are even more
convincing when the fact that several of the cases from the separation and
advice groups were moved to the arrest group is taken into account. 9
Because the removed cases were more serious or included offenses other
than domestic crimes, such as police resistance, one would expect this shift
to increase recidivism in the arrest group. Nonetheless, the arrest group
still scored lower in repeat offenses.
While the Minneapolis study does not support my hypothesis, there is
some indication that victim impact might differ according to intervention.
Comparing the advice and separation groups, the victim interviews state
more violence in the advice group and official reports state more violence
in the separation group. 90 This suggests that separation encouraged more
calls to the police than a mere visit and advice on the spot.
Similarly, the differences between intervention groups in the
Milwaukee study do not support my hypothesis. There may be reasons for

84. Berk et al., supra note 13, at 197.
85. See Berk et al., supra note 13, at 183 (Table 3).
86. See Berk et al., Deterrent Effect, supra note 42, at 701.
87. According to victim interviews, recidivism was 19% in the arrest group, 33% in the
separation group and 37% in the advice group. According to the official data, it was 10% in
arrest, 24% in separation and 19% in the advice group. See SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, supra note 7, at 278.
88. See id. at 278.
89. This crossover occurred in about 18% of the advice group cases and 23% of the
separation group cases. See id. at 274.
90. See supra note 87.
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these discrepancies related to the design of the study, but it is impossible to
estimate their impact. The three alternative group interventions were short
arrest, approximately three hours, full arrest, approximately eleven hours,
and warning. In the warning group, the parties were told that if the police
needed to return one of them would be arrested,9' thus discouraging victims
from contacting the police.9
At the six-month interview, victims reported recidivism in 35% of fullarrest cases, 30% of short-arrest cases and 31% of warning cases.93 Reports
to the police showed the same rate of repeat violence against the same
victims in each group.' Recidivism against any victim was slightly higher
in the short-arrest group than in the two other groups.
In the Milwaukee study, the researchers collected official data of
recidivism both before and after the randomly assigned method of
intervention. Reports of domestic violence and arrests increased in all
groups after the assigned method of intervention. 95 Interestingly, the
increase followed quite different patterns in different groups. Reports to
the police, reflecting the willingness of victims and their kin to report crime
to the police, increased most in the short-arrest group and least in the
warning group. It is possible that this pattern is dependent on the impact of
arrest on victims. The victims in the warning group may have been
discouraged from calling the police, since the police warned that they
would arrest either the victim or the perpetrator the next time they were
called.
Increases were high in repeat arrests and in reports to police in the
short-arrestrgroup. In the full-arrest group, both measures increased by
approximately 60%. In the warning group, reports to police increased the
least, 45%, whereas repeat arrests increased substantially, 82%. Since
arrest suggests that the case is serious, this may mean that victims in the
warning group called the police only in serious cases. Taking into account
that according to victim interviews the prevalence of repeat violence was
about the same in the short-arrest group as in the warning group, it is
possible that arrest encouraged victims to call the police.
C.

DOES LONG-TERM ESCALATION EXIST?

The author of the Minneapolis and Milwaukee studies has stressed that
the Milwaukee data shows escalation of violence in the short-arrest group
91. See SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 7, at 335.
92. See Zorza, supranote 71, at 966.
93. See Sherman & Schmidt, Variable Effects ofArrest, supra note 11, at 154.
94. See SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 7, at 353; Sherman et al.,
InitialDeterrence, supranote 11, at 836.
95. The increase in reports is mainly explained by the new arrest policy that was
introduced in Milwaukee shortly before the experiment was carried out in 1987 to 1988.
The domestic violence cases reported by the police during this time soared from 7,000 in
1986 to 8,700 in 1988. See SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 7, at 119.
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over time." During the second year after the initial intervention, the
frequency of officially recorded any-victim violence was twice as high in
the short-arrest group as in the warning group.97 Since we cannot compare
that information with victim-reported violence, it is equally possible that
victims were more willing to call the police after they had experienced an
arrest of the perpetrator.
Only the Omaha study has both victim interviews and official data one
year after intervention. Victim interviews reported repeat violence and
injuries at the same rate in arrest cases as in other cases." Official data
showed that more perpetrators were arrested and more complaints were
made in the arrest group.99 This again is consistent with my hypothesis that
this difference more likely results from a change in victims' patterns of
calling police than from a change in actual violence.
V. DISCUSSION
The immediate effect of arrest is unambiguous-arrest protects the
victim,' ° and the deterrent effect lasts at least one month following the
arrest.' °' The strength of the effect varied in different studies, but generally
the level of victims who were safe during the first month was five to ten
percentage points higher after arrest than after other methods of
intervention.
With the exception of the Milwaukee study, victim
interviews taken after six months show that arrest deters repeat violence.
After six months, according to the official data, the level of complaints
to police following intervention is either the same in all groups or higher in
the arrest group. The only exception is the original Minneapolis study, in
which based on both victim interviews and official data, repeat violence
was lowest in the arrest group."
Assuming that victim interviews give a more accurate picture of the
level of violence than the official data, four out of' six empirical studies

96. See id. at 188.
97. See id. at 352.
98. Zorza has calculated the prevalence of repeat violence and injuries to those victims
who gave interviews. There was no difference in physical injury among victims whose
perpetrators were either arrested or not arrested. Victims were hit or pushed slightly more
often in the arrest group, 53% versus 51% in the non-arrest group. See Zorza, supra note
71, at 988.
99. See Dunford, Measurement of Recidivism, supra note 10, at 124-27.
100. See Lisa A. Frisch, Research that Succeeds, the Policies that Fail, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 209, 212 (1992).
101. One exception is Charlotte, where no difference exists between the groups.
102. Garner, Fagan and Maxwell have also paid attention to the discrepancy between the
results of victim interviews and official data. Basing their analysis on any distinguishable
effect after six months, they report deterrence according to victim interviews in five out of
six studies and according to official data in three studies. See Garner et al., supra note 45, at
12. In Table 1, I interpret very little differences as the same level, whereas Garner, Fagan
and Maxwell interpret even a slight difference as deterrent/escalation.
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examined are consistent with the hypothesis presented in this Article. In
these four studies, victims who experienced an arrest of the perpetrator
suffered less repeat violence than victims whose perpetrators were treated
through other interventions. Yet, victims who experienced arrest of the
perpetrator called the police as often or more often than victims in other
intervention groups. A logical explanation is that victims who experienced
an arrest of the perpetrator were encouraged to call the police when
subsequently assaulted by the same perpetrator.
TABLE 1: EFFECT OF ARREST IN EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
Victim Interviews

Complaints

New Arrests

Minneapolis

Deterrence

Deterrence

Deterrence

Milwaukee

No deterrence

Same

Same

Omaha

Deterrence

Same

Charlotte

Same

Colorado
Springs
Miami

Deterrence

Slightly more
in arrest group
More in arrest
group
Same

Same

More in
arrest group

Deterrence

EXPLANATIONS:

Deterrence = Measure of repeat violence is lower in the arrest group than in
other treatment groups.
Same = Measure of repeat violence is almost the same in all intervention
groups.
More in arrest group = Measure of repeat violence is higher in the arrest
group.

The results of the four studies suggest that this hypothesis is worth
serious consideration. However, reexamination of these studies alone can
not validate this hypothesis. Both the original empirical studies and my
reexamination of them are strained by methodological problems that limit
the conclusions that can be drawn. First, two of six studies do not support
this hypothesis. This may depend on differences in the research design or
demographic factors of the sites. For example, Milwaukee had the highest
proportion of African-American suspects, probably an important factor in
assessing how arrest affects both suspects' and victims' behavior.
Secondly, due to the research design, the available data are neither
sufficient nor suitable for assessing how and to what extent arrest affected
victims' choices of whether to call the police in cases of repeat violence.
The studies did not collect data about victims' situations and the data
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collected was not fully reported. The effect of arrest might vary between
different victim groups, depending on the other resources available to the
victim, how dependent the victim is on the perpetrator and the victim's
social status and integration. To assess the factors, more information is
needed. While the studies reported the employment status of the victims as
compared to that of the perpetrators,' 3 they did not consider whether the
victims worked in their homes as full-time mothers. This is an important
factor in assessing the vulnerability of the victim.'O Miller and Krull's
analysis of victim interview data suggests that unemployed victims are
revictimized more than employed victims. 5 Further, the relationship
between the victim and the perpetrator is not consistently recorded. While
marital status is reported, the number of cohabiting couples is not reported
in a systematic way. Only one study reports how many couples were still
living together when the six-month interview was conducted. Due to these
deficiencies, how different victim variables affect victims' willingness to
report subsequent victimization is impossible to assess.
Thirdly, victim interview data was incomplete because not all victims
were reached for interviews. For instance, in the Minneapolis study, 62%
of the victims were reached for immediate interviews and 49% for the
interviews six months after the incident.'06 In Charlotte, the respective
portions were 65% and 50%.07 In Omaha, initial interviews were
conducted in 80% of cases and six-month follow-up interviews in 73%.'08
This was the main reason victim interview data was partly dismissed by the
authors.
In prevalence studies, victim surveys are usually treated as more
accurate measures of "real" crime than police statistics, because victims
reveal more crime than statistics and criminological research has not
discovered any constant ratio between crime reported and crime
experienced. Also in the empirical studies, victims reported more crimes in
interviews than they had reported to the police. By using the official data
103. In Minneapolis, 60% of both were unemployed. In Omaha, 50% of victims and 31%
of suspects were unemployed. See Dunford et al., Role of Arrest, supra note 10, at 194. In
Charlotte, one-third of victims and one-fifth of suspects were unemployed. See HIRSCHEL
ET AL., CHARLOTTE SPOUSE ASSAULT, supra note 12, at 26-37.
104. The published results of the Colorado Springs experiment state that in addition to the
10% who were unemployed, 30% of victims reported no occupation. See Berk et al., supra
note 13, at 175. Only the unpublished report reveals that one-third of those with no
occupation were housewives. See Berk et al., Colorado Springs Spouse Assault, supra note
39, at 55.
105. See MILLER & KRULL, supra note 33, at 246.
106. See Sherman & Berk, Specific DeterrentEffects, supra note 7, at 265.
107. See Hirschel & Hutchison, supra note 6, at I 10.
108. See Dunford et al., Role ofArrest, supra note 10, at 189.
109. The Colorado Springs study is the one exception. The authors questioned the
victim's ability to recall domestic violence incidents in the interviews. See Berk et al.,
supra note 13, at 197. With this one exception, victims recalled more incidents in the
interviews than were reported to the police. It is impossible to know if there was a
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as the measure of subsequent crime, the researchers necessarily assumed
that the ratio between experienced crime and reported crime was unaffected
by the victims' experience of police intervention. This is a bold
assumption, but it is not impossible.
When different intervention groups are compared, a crucial question is
whether the interview samples are biased against some forms of
intervention. In the empirical studies, different statistical tests were done to
find if there was a possible bias in the interviewed cases. No such
differences in dropout rates, "'1 variable interventions or background
variables were found that would have made interviewed cases qualitatively
different from the rest of the sample. "' Yet, Berk has suggested that the
victim interview data are qualitatively different from the official data
because victims whose perpetrators are most likely to be deterred by arrest
might be over-represented in the interview data. Most likely, deterred
perpetrators are employed or others with a "stake in conformity" for whom
an arrest may cause the most unfortunate consequences. Because of the
bias, victim interviews may overestimate the beneficial effect of arrest."'
In Colorado Springs, these effects were studied by comparing the effect
of arrest on employed and unemployed suspects. There were more calls to
the police in the unemployed group."3 While the victim interviews showed
no difference between employed and unemployed suspects when
intervention-as-assigned was used, it is possible that the difference in the
official data-increased calls to the police-is a result of the increased
willingness of victims to call the police in cases of repeat violence after
arrest. While it is clear that there is a difference between employed and
unemployed perpetrators, we can not know whether this difference in calls
to police is due to a difference in the level of repeat violence, in the
victims' response, or both.
Finally, the official data usually include domestic violence against any
victim, not only against the same victim who was involved when the initial
intervention was used. Thus, even if the original victims report less
violence in the interviews, it is possible that the perpetrators have only
shifted to new relationships and continued their violent behavior against
new partners. There is, however, no indication that this happened more
difference in the way the interviews were carried out. It is also possible that the victims
were particularly reluctant to report violence to the interviewers in Colorado Springs
because many of them were connected to the military and might have felt that it was a
particularly sensitive issue about which to talk.
110. See Dunford et al., Role ofArrest, supra note 10, at 198.
111. See Sherman & Berk, Specific DeterrentEffects, supra note 7, at 265; Dunford et al.,
Role of Arrest, supra note 10, at 188-89; HIRSCHEL ET AL., CHARLoTTE SPOUSE ASSAULT,
supra note 12, at 34-40; Hirschel & Hutchison, supra note 6, at 110 n.128.
112. Berk et al., supra note 13, at 197; Lawrence W. Sherman, The Influence of
Criminology on CriminalLaw: EvaluatingArrestsfor MisdemeanorDomestic Violence, 83
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 31 (1992).
113. See Berk et al., supra note 13, at 188-92.
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frequently in those cases in which arrest took place. In Charlotte, where a
same victim and any victim was
distinction between arrests involving
4
made, there was no difference."
To sum up, the methodological problems encountered do not show that
victim interview data was biased against arrest groups. It is possible that it
was, but we do not know that, nor do we know how it would be biased.
Therefore, we have to ask which is a more serious methodological problem,
to disregard victim interview data and possible effect on the victims'
behavior or use the data notwithstanding a possible bias. For me, the
answer is clear.
VI. CONCLUSION
Overall, the empirical studies support my hypothesis that arrest deters
violence and encourages victims to call the police. This explanation of the
data is also consistent with the overall increase in reporting domestic
violence to the police since the criminal justice system started taking these
Of course, overall awareness of domestic crime and
crimes seriously.'
public policies, such as mandatory arrest laws, affect victims' behavior
differently than individual experiences of arrest. These studies suggest,
however, that individual experiences with arrest affect victims' willingness
to report domestic violence.
In his discussion of policy recommendations based on these studies,
Professor Sherman emphasized a choice between the long-term escalation
effect of violence and immediate protection."6' Conclusions about longterm escalation were solely based on official data, which can be influenced
by victim impact. Therefore, the fear of long-term escalation may be
unfounded.
Also, the conclusion that arrest increases violence among unemployed
perpetrators is suspect because it is based on official data. Victim
interviews show that there is a deterrent effect among unemployed
suspects. While there is a difference between employed and unemployed
perpetrators, this may be a consequence of both different levels of violence
and different responses from the victims. Therefore, recommendations for
police practice in domestic violence should not be based on assumptions of
increased violence in the long-term or among unemployed perpetrators.
Instead, policy recommendations should be based on other considerations,
such as victim safety immediately after the arrest, justice and
proportionality. According to these studies, the short-term effect of the
arrest was clear, it protects the victim. This conclusion is far less
controversial than any conclusions about the long-term effects.
114. See Hirschel & Hutchison, supra note 6, at 109.
115. See generallysupra note 39 and 40.
116. See SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 7, at 205.
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This Article shows that we still do not know enough about the effects
of arrest. Reexamining the empirical studies shows that arrest probably
encourages victims to report subsequent violence to the police, as well as
decreases repeat violence. I think that this interpretation of the results is
more sound than those interpretations that only focus on the perpetrator.
The most important point of this Article is methodological. An
analysis of the effects of police intervention in domestic violence must be
based on both perpetrator and victim response. In interpreting the
empirical studies, we must ask: which is a more serious methodological
problem, not to recognize possible victim impact and use official data as
measurement of repeat violence, or to use victim interview data without
being able to control for a possible bias in interview drop-out? Since no
bias has been found, using the victim interview data to measure repeat
violence is a lesser problem. Of course, neither solution is satisfactory for
future research and therefore, victim impact must be considered an integral
part of future research designs.
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